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When states cooperate in order to form an international organization, they authorize it to have 
the power to perform certain functions with legal consequences. While performing these 
functions, an international organization may incur responsibilities to third parties. These third 
parties may be states, other organizations, individuals or legal persons. All the different 
possibilities regarding the status of the third party cause situations that differ greatly from each 
other. The main rule is that international organizations are responsible for the consequences of 
the acts performed by them.1 
The capacity of international organizations to be held responsible under international law 
corresponds to their respective capacities to operate under international law. The responsibility 
of international organizations varies according to the scope of their legal personality. The 
responsibility will depend on their legal status vis-à-vis both member and non-member states, 
and will differ from organization to organization.2 
With the increasing number of international organizations executing tasks with highly injurious 
potential, the responsibilities need to be defined clearly. The efforts to provide international 
organizations with the status of international legal subjects with a responsibility of their own 
have proved only partially successful. The law on the responsibility of international 
organizations is unclear.3 
The two principal aims of the law of international responsibility in both domestic common law 
and civil law systems are: i) to prevent or minimize breaches of obligations prescribed by law; 
and ii) to provide remedies for those subjects whose legal rights have been infringed due to such 
violations. A general examination of the evolution of the law in both international and national 
systems in recent decades shows a change of perspective. There used to be a tendency to stress 
the limitations of the obligations of the potential wrongdoer, but the emphasis has shifted and 
now tends to be on the rights of the injured parties.4  
 
1 Amerasinghe, C. F.: Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, Cambridge University 
Press, United Kingdom 2005, p. 408. 
2 Ginther, Konrad: International organizations, Responsibility, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, Volume II, North-Holland 1991, p. 1336. 
3 Ginther (1991) p. 1339. 
4 Hirsch, Moshe: The Responsibility of International Organizations Toward Third Parties: Some Basic Principles, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1995, p. 8. 
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Recently, international organizations in general and the United Nations (UN) in particular, 
have been placed under greater scrutiny.5 It is also noteworthy that the obligations of 
international organizations towards their member states have recently received some attention 
especially with regard to international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.6 
In academia, this shift towards a more critical approach is reflected in the decision of the 
International Law Association (ILA) to create an international research committee on the 
'Accountability of International Organizations'.7 
The current possibilities to bring international organizations to account for their actions are 
limited when compared to existing possibilities with respect to states. In the absence of effective 
legal remedies against international organizations directly, attempts to file claims against 
member states continue. The view of many international law experts is that member states of an 
international organization do not incur legal responsibility for the acts of the organization by 
virtue of their membership in it. However, some writers accept that member state responsibility 
might be in order, if effective remedies against international organizations are lacking.8 
Two basic questions are raised. Whether and under what conditions are international 
organizations obliged to comply with obligations under international law? What are the legal 
consequences of non-compliance, in particular regarding the responsibility of international 
organizations for damage caused in violation of the above-mentioned obligations? In theory, 
four alternatives can be offered as answers to these questions. The answers have also partly been 
followed in practice: i) Only the member states are held responsible, be it jointly, or severally 
and jointly; ii) the organization and the member states are held severally and jointly responsible; 
 
5 Wilde, Ralph: Enhancing accountability at the international level: the tension between international organization 
and member state responsibility and the underlying issues at stake, 12 ILSA Journal of International & 
Comparative Law, 395 – 415, Spring 2008, p. 399 and International Law Association, Final Report of the 
Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations (2004) and Resolution No. 1/(2004) both 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/9 (last visited on 11 March 2010). 
6 Darrow, Mac: Between light and shadow: The World Bank, the International Monetary and International 
Human Rights Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford/Oregon 2003, p. 132 An interesting curiosity about the World Bank 
is that it has established an Inspection Panel. The purpose of the Panel is to make sure that the Bank is acting in 
compliance with its own operational policies, i.e. not with obligations arising from general international law. The 
Inspectional Panel is an internal organ of the World Bank and can only recommend an investigation on other 
measures. For more on the topic, please see Shihata, Ibrahim F.I.: The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice, 
Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 56 and Roos, Stefanie-Ricarda: The World Bank Inspection Panel, Max Planck 
United Nations Law Yearbook 5, pp. 479-521, 2001, p. 482. 
7 Wilde (2008) p. 399 and International Law Association, Final Report of the Committee on the Accountability of 
International Organizations (2004) and Resolution No. 1/(2004) both available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/9 (last visited on 11 March 2010).  
8 Wilde (2008) pp. 400-401. 
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iii) the organization is held primarily responsible and the member states only secondarily 
responsible; or iv) the international organization is held exclusively responsible.9 
The aim of this article is to examine the responsibility of international organizations, from a 
procedural perspective as a contextual perspective. It touches upon the question of member 
state responsibility and the phenomenon of 'piercing the corporate veil'.10 Four concrete steps 
of improvement, which could be taken in order to improve the situation regarding 
international responsibility and to increase accountability, are proposed. 
II. The Legal Foundation for International Organizations 
2.1  Constituent Documents 
The basis of the legal order of an international organization is its constituent document. The 
constituent document, the constituent treaty, represents the top of the hierarchy of legal rules 
of the international organization.11 The constituent treaty differs from international treaties in 
general. For example, the purpose of constituent treaties is to create a new subject of law, which 
possesses certain autonomy. The constituent treaty forms the backbone of the international 
organization and aids in the process of identifying and organizing the competences of the 
organization.12 
The constituent treaty determines the legal nature of the instruments of an international 
organization, and the ways those instruments are created. However, the constituent treaty may 
be too vague or even if it is clear (as the Treaty of Rome), cases, where the instrument does not 
fit into the scope of the treaty may be presented in practice.13 
Often the objectives of normative texts are to authorize various bodies, especially international 
organizations, to contribute to the preservation of a harmonious international order. In this 
regard, the texts must offer clarity in defining the specific duties and jurisdiction of these bodies 
in order to avoid any straying from the true objectives of the organization. Straying from the 
 
9 Ginther (1991) p. 1336. 
10 While referring to international organizations, the 'corporate veil' means the same type of limited responsibility 
of the member states, as exists for the share holders of a limited liability company. 'Piercing the veil' -situation thus 
refers to a situation, where member state responsibility is invoked. 
11 Schermers, Henry G. & Blokker, Niels M.: International Institutional Law, Kluwer Law International, the 
Netherlands 1995, p. 1195, para. 1899. 
12 Diez de Velasco Vallejo, Manuel: Les organisations internationales, Economica, Paris 2002, p. 107. 
13 Klabbers, Jan: An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 
2005, p.197. 
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objectives can result in violations of law and cause harm to third parties.14 Unsuccessfully 
directed involvement by international organizations may blur the distinction between their 
positive value and unreasonable, regulatory involvement that has a negative effect on the 
international order. That is why the roles of international organizations must be clear. That is 
also why the normative texts providing the justification and authority for these roles must be as 
clear as possible. The texts that international organizations themselves produce and apply in the 
execution of their responsibilities, must also be drafted and interpreted with extreme care, 
taking into consideration the juridical instruments on which the work relies. These texts 
provide legitimacy for the acts of the organization.15 The general starting point, when examining 
issues of responsibility of international organizations is the text of the constituent treaty in each 
case.16 
International organizations can be regarded as subjects of international law. Three indicators 
can be used to define an international subject. The first indicator is whether the subject in 
question has the right to enter into international agreements. The second is whether it has the 
right to send and receive delegations, and the third is whether it can file and receive 
international claims. However, even though an organization would not fulfil one of these 
requirements, it could still be regarded as an organization, and the list is not a comprehensive 
description of subjects of international law.17 
To be able to attain the aims presented in the constituent documents, international 
organizations need the attribution of competences, a legal personality, organs and financial and 
personnel resources.18 In order to operate in the guidelines provided to the international 
organization, it also needs the capacity to create legal instruments.19  
 
14 Araujo, Robert John (2005): Objective Meaning of Constituent Instruments and Responsibility of International 
Organization. In Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today, pp. 343 – 353, Koninklijke Brill NV, 
the Netherlands 2005, p. 346. 
15 Araujo (2005) p. 347. 
16 Brownlie, Ian: The Responsibility of States for the Acts of International Organizations. In Maurizio Ragazzi (ed.), 
International Responsibility Today, pp. 355 – 362, Koninklijke Brill NV, the Netherlands 2005, p. 359. 
17 Klabbers (2005) p. 44. 
18 Colliard, Claude-Albert – Dubouis, Louis: Institutions Internationales, Dalloz, Paris 1995, p. 172. 
19 Klabbers (2005) p. 197. Note that the generic term ‘instruments’ includes but is not limited to international 
agreements. It covers also other legal documents, such as rules and decisions, which can also be seen as rather 
generic categories. The core of the matter is that any problem can be solved provided that the right tools exist, and 
by the term ‘instruments’, it is meant to express that international organizations need the capacity to create these 
tools. 
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2.2  International Legal Personality 
The notion of 'legal personality' is originally a concept of private law. It was designed to enable a 
group of persons to function as an autonomous entity in pursuit of a certain goal. The legal 
personality of these entities is derived from the individuals who form the entity. Therefore, the 
theoretical distinction sometimes made between original and derivative legal persons was 
born.20  
The international legal personality of an international organization means that it possesses 
rights, duties, powers and liabilities distinct from its members or its creators on the 
international plane and in international law. The question what these powers are, is a harder 
one to answer, as the international legal personality is rarely explicitly mentioned in the 
constituting acts of organizations.21 
Unlike most domestic legal orders, international law does not have a code or a statute, which 
contains the requirements for obtaining legal personality or capacities that result from it.22 
The international personality of international organizations has evolved, and it can be said that 
they have a legal personality that is distinct from their member states. The organizations not 
only have the capability to possess rights or obligations in international relations, but also when 
they operate in the territory of a state.23 The fact that little doctrinal work on the subject of the 
legal personality of international organizations has appeared after the beginning of the 1970s, 
may be seen as evidence of the fact that the international system has evolved to a point where 
the legal personality of international organizations as such is no longer an issue.24 
2.3  Domestic Legal Personality 
Every domestic legal system is free to develop its own requirements for a legal personality to 
exist. This does not mean that these various differing requirements would be unrelated. Many 
constituent treaties of international organizations also have provisions regarding their legal 
 
20 Muller, A.S.: International Organizations and their Host States, Aspects of their Legal Relationship, Kluwer Law 
International, the Netherlands 1995, p. 72. 
21 Amerasinghe, C.F.: Local Remedies in International Law, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 2004, 
p. 78, 
22 Muller (1995) p. 72. 
23 Diez de Velasco Vallejo (2006) p. 14. The Articles of the constituting acts of certain international organizations 
defining the international legal personality: European Community (EC) art. 281; European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) art. 6; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) art. XII; 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) art 27; International Maritime Organization (IMO) art. 49; 
Organization of American States (OAS) art. 139. Articles defining the domestic legal personality: UN art. 104; EC 
art. 282 Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) art. 3.2. 
24 Muller (1995) p. 73. 
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personality under the domestic law of their member states. These provisions, naturally, can 
only affect the organization’s position within its member states – states that are not members 
define the legal status of the organization in accordance with their national law. This often 
depends on the government's opinion regarding the organization’s status in general – whether 
it has recognized the organization or not. The domestic legal personality of an organization may 
extend to its various organs, and even its subsidiary bodies.25 
The acquisition of legal personality under international law does not depend on the inclusion 
of a specific provision in the constituent instrument. However, all the better if such a provision 
can be found, as, for example Article 104 of the United Nations Charter, which reads as 
follows: 
“The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.” 
The purpose of this type of provision in the constituent instrument or the headquarters 
agreement is to impose on the member states or the host state an obligation to recognize the 
legal personality of the organization under national law. 26 
In addition to the constituent treaty, a particularly important source for answers regarding the 
domestic legal personality of an international organization is the Headquarters Agreement, 
concluded between the organization and the host state. This agreement determines the 
immunities and privileges of the organization and creates a particular legal status that derogates 
from the automatic application of national law.27 On the international level there are two ways 
to lay down the parameters for the national legal personality of international organizations. 
Firstly, there are those provisions that state that the organization: shall enjoy in the territory of 
its member states 'the legal capacity necessary to exercise its functions'. This is a functional 
description of the concept. The second way explicitly indicates what capacities the national legal 
personality includes. According to one 'model description', the international organization shall 
have the capacity to: i) contract; ii) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; 
and iii) to institute legal proceedings. There is no substantial difference between the two above-
mentioned ways of determining domestic legal personality, although both organizations and 
states tend to prefer one of the two.28 
 
25 Klabbers (2005) pp. 49-52. 
26 See Official Records of the General Assembly Fifty-eight Session, Supplement No. 10(A/58/10) (2003) pp. 29 – 
54, Report of the International Law Commission (ILC), 55th session (5 May – 6 June and 7 July – 8 August 2003) 
p. 41. 
27 Colliard – Dubouis (1995) p. 174. 
28 Muller (1995) pp. 89-90. Muller presents as an example the fact that financial institutions seem to have a 
preference for the model description. 
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2.4  Attributed, Implied and Inherent Powers 
In order to be able to operate, international organizations need legal competence, i.e. legal 
powers. The possible origins of this competence or these powers are not as clear as their 
necessity. The debate between attributed, implied and inherent powers is interesting, and as it 
is necessary to know what exactly the existing powers are for us to be able to define an act 
beyond these powers, the three possibilities of origin are shortly presented below.  
Attributed powers basically mean that international organizations are only authorized to do 
things they are empowered to do. The principle of attribution faces at least two problems. 
Firstly, the whole idea of creating international organizations loses ground, if these 
organizations are nothing more than spokespersons of their member states. The second 
problem relates to the fundamental idea of an international organization. As they are 
considered dynamic and living creatures that are in constant development, their founding 
members can hardly envisage their future completely. This creates a major practical problem, if 
attributed powers are considered the only powers an organization can have.29 
The doctrine of implied powers was first developed in order to solve the division of power 
between central government and local authorities in the context of federal states. There are two 
ways in which implied powers can be considered to exist. The first way supposes that implied 
powers flow from a rule of interpretation that treaty rules must be interpreted so as to 
guarantee their fullest effect. The second version suggests that a power is implied in the 
functions and objectives of the organization. The latter version has been criticised, but is often 
thought to have prevailed.30 
As both of the above-mentioned doctrines have their problems, a third one has been presented. 
According to the third alternative, established organizations would possess inherent powers to 
perform all those acts, which they need to perform in order to reach their goals, simply because 
they are inherent in being an organization.31 
Usually, when important powers, as in the above-mentioned situations, have been attributed to 
international organizations, parliamentary and judicial organs have also been established. These 
structures are needed to provide necessary checks and balances.32 
 
29 Klabbers (2005) pp. 63-67. 
30 Klabbers (2005) pp. 67-73. 
31 Klabbers (2005) p. 75. 
32 Schermers – Blokker (1995) p. 1193 para. 1897. 
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III. Governing Laws and Supervisory Mechanisms 
3.1  The Governing Law 
The law governing the relations between international organizations and states is generally 
international law. Therefore, in states’ relations with organizations as members the constituent 
instrument would basically be applicable as an international treaty, subject to international law. 
There may also be relationships between states and organizations which involve separate 
agreements governed by international law. Examples of these agreements would be headquarter 
agreements and peacekeeping agreements.33  
However, there may be direct relations between international organizations and states, which 
are governed by national or by international law. As an example, the supply of gas or electricity 
by a state to an international organization will generally be governed by the national law of that 
state. Responsibility of states to international organizations may in the appropriate situation 
and circumstances, for example, if armed forces or police damage the property of an 
organization, be governed by international law. The converse situation regarding the 
responsibility of an organization to a state, may also be governed by international law, for 
example, when an official of an organization in the performance of his duties damages state 
property. The ownership of immovable property and the rights and duties relating to it, are 
generally governed by the national law of the state, where the property is located (lex situs). 
Therefore, the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), for example, have registered the ownership of the 
buildings they own in the USA in the appropriate registry. It is understood that the 
consequences of ownership in terms of rights, derive from the national law concerned.34 
It must be stated that international organizations also have diverse relations with entities other 
than states, such as natural persons and corporations, and these relations are governed by either 
national or international law. There is a wide range of choices regarding the law of contracts or 
agreements, and if no expressed choice is made, principles of private international law apply to 
determining the proper law applicable to the contract.35 
The mechanisms of bringing international organizations to account for their actions are limited 
when compared to such mechanisms existing with respect to states.36 A major issue is the 
question whether and to what extent the application of systems of public order can be evaded 
by the claim that it was not the member states, but the organization that was involved in the 
activities concerned. One such case, Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium concerned the legality of 
 
33 Amerasinghe (2005) p. 387.  
34 Amerasinghe (2005) p. 387. 
35 Amerasinghe (2005) p. 388. 
36 Wilde (2008) p. 400. 
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use of force. In 2004 three of the respondent states contended at the preliminary objections 
phase at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that because the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) possesses legal personality, it is the organization and not the individual 
member states that should bear the responsibility.37 
Concerning member state responsibility, in the case of Waite and Kennedy v. Germany in 1999, 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR), in an Article 6 case, 
observed that: 
“The Court is of the opinion that where States establish international organizations in 
order to pursue or strengthen their cooperation in certain fields of activities, and where 
they attribute to these organizations certain competences and accord them immunities, 
there may be implications as to the protection of fundamental rights. It would be 
incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention, however, if the Contracting 
States were thereby absolved from their responsibility under the Convention in relation to 
the field of activity covered by such attribution. It should be recalled that the Convention 
is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory rights, but rights that are practical and 
effective. This is particularly true for the right of access to the courts in view of the 
prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial….”38 
While the case concerned human rights, the principle applied would seem to be a general one. 
A state cannot escape responsibility by creating an international organization. It is also clear 
that responsibility for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is 
itself a form of state responsibility.39 
The decisions of deliberative, legislative or executive organs of organizations may need to be 
interpreted and legally examined either by the organs themselves, by other organs or by 
international or national tribunals. As an example, the decisions of the General Assembly or 
the Security Council of the UN relating to peace-keeping may fall into this category. In 1982 a 
resolution of the General Assembly relating to the UN Council for Namibia was brought before 
an organ of the UN for interpretation. The Legal Counsel of the UN gave an opinion in which 
he advised that because the resolution conferred a representative function on the Council, it 
had the power to conclude contracts on behalf of Namibia. His opinion was followed.40 
 
37 Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (2004), Judgment of the International Court of Justice, 
15 December 2004. Commented by Brownlie (2005), see the preliminary objections of France, Italy and Portugal, 
available at www.icj-cij.org applications submitted in 1999 (last visited 14 March 2010). 
38 See as recent authority, Aït-Mouhoub v. France (Case No 103/1997/887/1099) (28 October 1998, unreported) (p. 52) 
referring to Airey v. Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305 at 314-315) Waite and Kennedy v. Germany (Application no. 
26083/94), 118 International Law Reports (ILR) (2001), 121, at 135 (p. 67). 
39 Brownlie (2005) p. 361. 
40 Amerasinghe (2005) pp. 61 and the opinion of the Legal Counsel of the UN of 14 April 1982: United Nations 
Juridical Yearbook (UNJY) (1982) pp. 164-165. 
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3.2  Supervisory Mechanisms 
3.2.1  The International Court of Justice 
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the UN. It is one of the six major organs of the 
organization and the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
established by the League of Nations (LN). The Statute of the Court is an integral part of the 
UN Charter, and as a government ratifies the Charter, the ratification includes automatically 
the acceptance of the Statute. However, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court further 
requires an acceptance by the state41.  
In addition to hearing contentious cases, the ICJ is authorized to issue advisory opinions on 
legal questions. The UN Charter provides that the UN General Assembly and the Security 
Council may request such opinions and that the General Assembly may authorize other organs 
and the specialized agencies to request opinions on legal questions within the scope of their 
activities. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, and all the 
specialized agencies except the Universal Postal Union have been granted general authority of 
this kind.42 
The ICJ hears cases that are referred to it by the contending parties. The Court may, however, 
determine that the case, because of its nature, is not subject to judicial determination or that 
the parties have no legal right to submit the case to the ICJ. Only states are entitled to bring 
cases before the ICJ.43 
No state is required to submit any case (filed, for example, by another state) for hearing and 
decision. This lack of compulsory jurisdiction is a major deficiency of the international legal 
system as contrasted with national legal systems.44 The freedom to choose whether or not the 
states will submit any particular case for judicial determination is a feature of sovereignty that 
states refuse to surrender to international authority. After agreeing to submit a case to the 
Court, the state is bound by the principles of international law to accept and carry out the 
decision, although there is no satisfactory means for enforcement of decisions, and refusal to 
comply has occurred on more than one occasion.45 
Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ includes a partial attempt to overcome the lack of 
compulsory jurisdiction. The Article 36 section 2 provides that any party to the Statute may 
 
41 Unlike the League arrangement in which the PCIJ and its membership were independent of the League, 
Bennett, LeRoy A.: International organizations, Principles and Issues, Prentice-Hall Inc., New Jersey 1995, p. 75. 
42 Bennett (1995), p. 76.  
43 Bennett (1995) p. 76 and The Statute of the International Court of Justice, see for example www.icj-cij.org (last 
visited 14 March 2010). 
44 Bennett (1995) p. 76.  
45 Bennett (1995) p. 187. 
 Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 
issue 2010#1 
11
declare, that it recognizes as compulsory, in relation to any other state accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: i) the interpretation of 
a treaty; ii) any question of international law; iii) the existence of any fact which, if established, 
would constitute a breach of an international obligation; and iv) the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. Article 36 section 2 was an 
attempt to build a bridge between the principle of sovereignty and that of compulsory 
jurisdiction. The intention was to open an area in which a degree of international order could 
be established through the judicial process.46 
This 'optional clause' described above has not resulted in the submission of a wide range of 
disputes over legal questions to the Court for settlement. Several states have attached 
reservations to their acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The broadest of 
these reservations was made by the United States (US) in the Connally Amendment, which 
specified that the jurisdiction of the Court would not apply to “disputes with regard to matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the US as determined by the United States 
of America”. Not only did this reservation practically nullify the compulsory jurisdiction clause 
by allowing the US to decide unilaterally that any case it wished not to submit was 'essentially' 
one of domestic jurisdiction, but it also allowed, under the legal principle of reciprocity, any 
other party to a case involving the US to invoke the same privilege. The jurisdiction of the 
Court in contentious matters is by no means limited to the 'optional clause' of its Statute and 
the voluntary submission of cases by parties to disputes. Hundreds of bilateral and multilateral 
treaties contain clauses agreeing that the parties will submit disputes arising under the terms of 
each treaty to the ICJ. The most recent cases submitted to the Court have in fact been based on 
such treaty agreements.47 
The reformation of the role of the ICJ could serve to facilitate the enforcement of international 
responsibility. In order to achieve this improvement, the international organizations would need 
to be allowed to become parties to cases before the Court. The ILA Committee acquired detailed 
proposals regarding the issue, drawn up by one of its Co-Rapporteurs. The views of the members 
differed on the substantive merits of these proposals; some members were strongly in favour, as 
others doubted whether these proposals would prove to be practicable, or even desirable.48 
 
46 Bennett (1995) p. 187. As an example, Russia has not declared that it recognizes ipso facto the Courts jurisdiction 
in accordance with Article 36(2). Thus relating to the crisis in Georgia in August 2008, Georgia had to file a case 
against Russia on the basis of Article 36(1), which states that the Court has jurisdiction (regardless of a specific 
declaration by a UN member state) in all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the UN or in treaties and 
conventions in force. Georgia filed an application to the Court claiming that Russia had violated the provisions of 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Please see 
Georgia v. Russian Federation, Press Release on 12 August 2008 (2008/23), www.icj-cij.org (last visited on 14 March 
2010). 
47 Bennett (1995) pp. 187-188. 
48 International Law Association Final Report, Berlin Conference, Committee on Accountability of International 
Organizations, 2004, p. 49. 
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Due to their permanent cooperation with international organizations through membership 
links or otherwise, states have a greater risk than non-state operators of finding themselves 
opposed to an international organization in a dispute or a difference, but cannot bring a claim 
against an international organization before the ICJ as a result of the wording of Article 34(1) 
of the Court’s Statute. A judicial remedy from the International Court of Justice for the 
tortuous and/or organizational responsibility of an international organization might be 
obtained in either a direct or an indirect way – by allowing more flexibility regarding Advisory 
Opinions or by clearly amending Article 34(1) to read as follows: 
“States and International Organizations, duly authorized by their constituent instrument, may be 
parties in cases before the Court.”49 
3.2.2  Internal Remedies and National Courts 
Exhaustion of local or internal remedies regarding the relationship between states and 
international organizations (or between international organizations themselves) and in regard to 
the employment relationship between international organizations and their staff can be 
discussed. Since international organizations are a comparatively recent phenomenon, the rule 
of local remedies, which has a much longer history than the life of international organizations, 
cannot be regarded as intrinsic to the law of international organizations. If the rule is to be 
applicable in any way in this area, it will be by analogy or on the basis that in specific situations 
it may be appropriate to apply the rule itself or a similar rule in a different form. What must be 
discussed then is how far the law of international organizations, in terms of its policies and 
objectives, requires that the rule of local or internal remedies or an analogous rule be applied to 
certain situations which arise in the functioning of such organizations. The position is 
somewhat complicated, because there seem to be no judicial decisions or agreed or accepted 
practice in the area of the relations between organizations and states. In the area of employment 
relations, on the other hand, the situation is different, as the relevant basic premises are 
distinct.50 
In the case of the relationship between states and international organizations, it is only since 
the international legal personality of such organizations was formally recognized in the 
Reparation for Injuries Case51 that the question was seriously asked whether it was proper that the 
rule of local or internal remedies be applied in that area. The question may be asked both 
 
49 ILA Final Report (2004) pp. 51-52. 
50 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 366. For an interesting case regarding an employment relationship please see Boivin c. la 
France et la Belgique et 32 autres Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe, (Application No. 73250/01, decision only 
available in French) ECrtHR, 9 September 2008. 
51 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of 
Justice, 11 April 1949. 
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where the international organization is a claimant on behalf of an individual against a state 
and where a state claims on behalf of a national or individual against an international 
organization. A third situation which has involved the exhaustion of internal remedies is where 
a staff member brings a claim against an organization under the internal law of the organization 
in regard to his employment relationship. This situation concerns a relationship which is 
entirely internal to the organization.52 
Regarding the implementation of responsibility of international organizations, jurisdictional 
immunity remains a decisive barrier to remedial action for non-state claimants. This could be 
corrected by the availability of adequate alternative remedial protection mechanisms within 
international organizations.53 
Since the Reparation for Injuries case, it has been established that international organizations 
such as the UN have the capacity at international law to bring claims, particularly against states 
in situations in which a right relating to a staff member and vested in the organization has been 
violated. This followed the recognition of the international personality of the UN in the same 
case. After the decision in this case, it was suggested that the rule of local remedies should be 
applied, apparently without qualification, to claims on behalf of staff members, because it 
would save the UN much trouble and give to the respondent state an opportunity to repair 
through its own means the injury caused by it.54 
In the proceedings before the ICJ in the Reparation for Injuries case, the counsel for the Secretary 
General of the UN stated that, in the context of claims by the UN against states for injuries to 
its officials, there was ‘room for consideration’ whether the rule of local remedies was 
applicable. However, in the memorandum of the Secretary General to the General Assembly, 
explaining what procedures should be taken pursuant to the case, no mention was made of the 
rule. Consequently, no reference is made to the rule in the resolution of the General Assembly 
dealing with the matter. However, it has been submitted subsequently that, where a staff 
member of the organization has been threatened with a private nuisance, he or she should first 
have recourse to local remedies, no waiver of immunity being necessary because the acts are of a 
private character over which local courts would have jurisdiction in any case. It has also been 
suggested in this connection that after exhausting remedies a staff member of an international 
organization should be able to seek the protection of the organization which he serves rather 
 
52 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 367. 
53 Gaillard, Emmanuel – Pingel-Lenuzza, Isabelle: International Organizations and Immunity from Jurisdiction: to 
Restrict or to Bypass, International & Comparative Law Quarterly (ICLQ) Vol. 51 No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 1-15. 
Cambridge University Press, p.2. 
54 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 367 
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than that of his national state, because of the primary allegiance which he owes to the 
organization.55 
There are several problems connected with the view that the rule of local remedies applies to 
claims by international organizations on behalf of their staff members. First, it must be 
recognized that in the Reparation for Injuries case what the ICJ acknowledged was that as a result 
of the fact that international organizations such as the UN may carry international 
responsibility; such organizations had the right to bring claims on behalf of their staff members 
for injuries suffered in the performance of their official functions.56  
The Court made a clear distinction between a staff member acting in his official capacity and 
the treatment of such a staff member in his personal capacity.57 It would seem that where a staff 
member is injured while performing his official duties, the organization would have the 
exclusive right of protection. Then again, where the injury takes place when he or she is in his 
private capacity or in his or her private life, his or her national state would have the right of 
protection. Some may believe that it is undesirable that a staff member should have to rely on 
his or her national state for protection in his private life. However, if he or she is to be able to 
maintain his or her independence in the performance of his official duties, the better view, in 
the light of the Reparations for Injuries case, seems to be that the organization has the right of 
protection only where the staff member is acting in an official capacity.58 
The opposite situation, where the international organization is the respondent in a case 
involving the protection of a national, raises different problems. The question is whether, 
where the international organization does provide internal means of settling disputes between 
such persons and itself, they have an obligation to exhaust such remedies before their national 
states may exercise diplomatic protection.59 
Immunity of the UN, for example, often sets a barrier for the use of national courts. As an 
example, a national court in the Netherlands declared on 10 July 2008 it had no competence to 
hear an action instituted against the UN. The judgment was delivered in the incidental 
proceedings in the civil case brought by the Association ‘Mothers of Srebrenica’ and ten 
individual plaintiffs against the State of the Netherlands and the UN. The basis of the claim 
was that the Association considered the UN and the Netherlands to be responsible for the 
murder of 8.000-10.000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. The Association represented 
the interests of the victims’ relatives. Central to the issue of whether a Dutch court had 
 
55 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 368. 
56 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 368. 
57 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 369. 
58 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 369. 
59 Amerasinghe (2004) p. 371. 
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jurisdiction in this case, was the question whether the case offered grounds or reasons to 
make an exception to the immunity enjoyed by the UN under international law, in accordance 
with Article 105 of the UN Charter and Article II, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (the Privileges Convention). The court 
concluded that in international law practice absolute immunity of the UN is the standard and 
is respected, and that the interpretation of Article 105 of the UN Charter offers no basis for 
restriction of the immunity of the UN.60 
3.2.3  Arbitral Tribunals 
The Final report of the ILA in 2004 stated that when concluding agreements with states or non-
state entities, international organizations should continue adding a clause providing for 
compulsory referral to arbitration of any dispute that the parties have been unable to settle 
through other means. The Report further stated that international organizations should 
faithfully comply with their undertakings to resort to arbitration procedures.61 
When inserting an arbitration clause into treaties concluded between them, states, 
international organizations and non-state entities should consider the compulsory arbitration 
provided for in such clauses to be governed by the 1996 Optional Rules for Arbitration 
involving International Organizations, drawn up by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.62 
There have been rare cases where international organizations have been reluctant to cooperate 
with the establishment of an arbitral tribunal. By agreeing to an arbitration clause the 
international organization waives its right to invoke its immunity before the arbitral tribunal, 
and this waiver has to be understood as including any means that a party, having accepted the 
principle of recourse to arbitration, may attempt to invoke in order to hinder the arbitral 
process.63 
3.3  Case Law 
3.3.1  Reparation for Injuries – A Landmark Case 
Case law on international responsibility of or to international organizations is scarce. However, 
established practice since the creation of the LN, which no longer exists, and particularly after 
 
60 Please see Association of Mothers of Srebrenica et. al v. the State of The Netherlands and The United Nations (case 
number 295247), District Court in the Hague, the Netherlands, 10 July 2008, 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/7/766.html (last visited 23 May 2010). 
61 ILA Final Report (2004) p. 49. 
62 ILA Final Report (2004) p. 49. 
63 Gaillard – Pingel-Lenuzza (2002) p. 13. 
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WW II has rested on certain assumptions. The principal international judicial precedent 
relating to the subject of international responsibility is the Reparation for Injuries Case64, brought 
before the ICJ.65 
The advisory opinion of the Court was a landmark in establishing the international personality 
of the UN with attendant rights in international law. The ICJ ruled that the member states in 
setting up the UN intended to confer upon it the capacity to operate on the international plane 
and to exercise rights and duties necessary to carry out its functions. Its privileges are not 
necessarily identical with those of a state, but the organization must be deemed to have such 
powers, even if not expressly stated in the Charter that are essential to the performance of its 
duties. This idea is a principle of implied powers that opens the door to a generous 
interpretation of the prerogatives of international organizations. In reconciling the UN’s right 
to claim damages with the state interest involved, the Court advised that neither party has 
priority and that any conflict of interest might be resolved by accommodation.66 
The Advisory opinion of the ICJ on the Reparation for injuries case marks the beginning of the 
judicial recognition that the UN has powers other than those expressly conferred by the 
member states in the constituent treaty.67 
3.3.2  Westland Helicopters Ltd. 
Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Arab Organization for Industrialization arbitration by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1984 and the subsequent appeals in Swiss courts are some of 
the most important cases regarding the responsibility of international organizations with 
relation to member state responsibility.68  
The organization in question here was the Arab Organization for Industrialization 
(AOI), which was founded by a treaty concluded between the United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the Arab Republic of Egypt.69On 27 February 1978, Westland 
Helicopters Ltd. (Westland), a company subject to English law, and the AOI concluded 
a contract called the Shareholder Agreement, as an aim to create a joint stock company. 
 
64 ICJ Reports (1949) p. 174. 
65 Amerasinghe (2005) pp. 384-385. 
66 Bennett (1995) p. 201. 
67 Martin Martinez, Magdalena M.: National Sovereignty and International Organizations, Kluwer Law 
International, the Netherlands 1996, p. 82. 
68 Westland Helicopters v. Arab Organization for Industrialization and Others (International Chamber of Commerce, Arbitral 
Tribunal, Case no 3879)), 80 International Law Reports (1989), (hereinafter Westland case, ICC (1984) and the 
subsequent cases in Geneva Court of Justice (Switzerland), 23 October 1987 and Federal Supreme Court, 
Switzerland, 19 July 1988. See also International Legal Materials (ILM) 23 (1984) p. 1071. 
69 Westland case, ICC (1984) pp. 596-603 and Hirsch (1995) p. 107. 
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The AOI was to have 70 % of the shares and Westland 30 %. The purpose of the 
company, The Arab British Helicopter Company (ABH) was to function as the legal 
base for the creation of a business to manufacture, overhaul, carry out quality control 
on and sell the Lynx helicopters developed by Westland. Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar declared in May 1979 that they wished to liquidate the AOI, a liquidation 
committee would be set up, and that all investments in the armaments business in 
question would be discontinued. Egypt held that the AOI was still in existence as a legal 
person. 70In June 1980, an arbitration request was filed by Westland against the AOI, 
the four member states and the ABH. Westland claimed that the organization and its 
members were bound to pay under a joint and several liability the sum of 126.000.000 
pounds sterling to the claimant. In October 1980, an Arbitral Tribunal of the ICC was 
constituted.71 
In the proceedings the question of member state responsibility arose and the Arbitral Tribunal 
concluded that in the absence of any specific provisions the member states were liable for the 
debts of the organization.72 The ruling was, however, overturned by the subsequent appeals in 
Swiss courts, which found that the Arbitral Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over Egypt in the 
absence of an arbitration agreement signed by Egypt.73 In addition to this, the Court of Justice 
of Geneva did not agree with the observation of the Arbitral Tribunal regarding the status of 
the AOI, and it stated that the AOI was “legally and financially, an organization independent of 
the founding states”. 74After the Court of Justice of Geneva, the case went to the Federal 
Supreme Court of Switzerland. The Federal Court upheld the decision of the Geneva Court 
and approved its principal reasoning. In the reasoning of the Federal Court, it placed great 
significance on the constituent instruments of the AOI.75 
In an analysis performed by Hirsch, two main points arise regarding both sets of proceedings. 
In the arbitral award, the two main conclusions were that i) the doctrine of limited 
responsibility was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal and that ii) the reasoning inclines to impose 
a secondary responsibility on the member states of international organizations. In the Swiss 
Courts, the two main principles were that i) the responsibility should be determined almost 
exclusively in accordance with the constituent instruments and that ii) when the constituent 
instrument shows that the organization is a legal entity separate from its member states, this 
separation will exempt the members from responsibility towards third parties.76 
 
70 Westland case, ICC (1984) pp. 596-603. The details more thoroughly discussed by Hirsch, pp. 107-112. 
71 Westland case, ICC (1984) pp. 604-605 and Hirsch p. 108. 
72 Westland case, ICC (1984) pp. 600, 613. 
73 Westland case, ICC (1984) p. 641. 
74 Westland case, ICC (1984) pp. 641-646 and Hirsch (1995) p. 110. 
75 Westland Helicopters v. Arab Organization for Industrialization and Others (Federal Supreme Court, Switzerland 
(1980) 80 ILR, p. 652. 
76 Hirsch (1995) pp. 111-112. 
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3.3.3  The International Tin Council  
Another strong example of relevant case law in the field is the International Tin Council 
litigation in the 1980s.77  
The ITC was an international organization established by a treaty (the Sixth International Tin 
Agreement) concluded in 1982 between 23 parties, including the UK and the EEC. The 
agreement stated that the ITC has a legal personality and that the executive chairman of the 
ITC is responsible for the administration and operation of the agreement in accordance with 
the decisions made by the ITC.78  
The purpose of the ITC was to regulate the international tin market, to adjust and balance 
world production and consumption of tin, and to maintain market prices stable by buying 
and selling tin on the international markets. Due to an unexpected overproduction of tin 
and financial mistakes, the ITC collapsed in 1985 and left behind numerous unpaid 
obligations. The creditors resorted to litigation mostly in English courts by bringing, inter 
alia, the claim that there was a subsidiary or complementary liability of member states.79  
The main question was, whether the ITC was itself alone responsible for the contracts it made 
or whether the member states were additionally or alone responsible, either as ‘partners’ or as 
principals of an agent.80 The constitutive treaty of the ITC did not provide for any responsibility 
of the member states, nor was there a clause excluding the responsibility of the member states. 
The courts examined whether there was a general rule of international law which provided for a 
secondary responsibility of member states in this case. After thorough and elaborate Court 
proceedings, where the judges reviewed the existing international case law and the writings of 
leading international law jurists, both the Court of Appeals and the House of Lords concluded 
that there was no such rule and dismissed the claims.81 The Court of Appeals held that 
“nothing is shown of any practice of states as to the acknowledgement or acceptance of direct 
liability by any states by reason of the absence of an exclusion clause”.82 Cases were also brought 
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities, but were withdrawn before the 
judgment was rendered. The first question for the Court to decide would have been the 
question of admissibility.83 
 
77 Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd. v. International Tin Council, High Court, Chancery Division, United Kingdom 13 May 
1987 (No. 2) and 9 July 1987, and Court of Appeal, United Kingdom, 27 April 1988. 
78 Amerasinghe (2005) p. 410. 
79 Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz: Piercing the Corporate Veil of International Organizations: The International Tin 
Council Case in the Englich Court of Appeals, 32 German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 43-54, 1989, p. 44.  
80 Lewis, Charles J.: State and Diplomatic Immunity, Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. 1990, p. 173.. 
81 Hirsch (1995) pp. 115-121. 
82 Maclaine Watson & Co Ltd. v. International Tin Council (No. 2), 80 ILR. pp. 110, 174. 
83 Hirsch (1995) p. 121. 
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After the collapse of the ITC the operation of a commodity agreement was added as a new 
testing ground for the responsibility of international organizations. In the debate on the 
responsibility of international organizations, the view that international organizations are 
endowed with an international legal personality, and with a responsibility for wrongful acts 
towards third parties irrespective of their prior recognition, started gaining ground.84 
3.3.4  Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway 
A rather recent and interesting case on the topic was the Behrami and Saramati case in the 
ECrtHR in 2007. Based on the doctrine of attributability, and a movement from 'effective 
control' towards 'ultimate control', the ECrtHR found in the case of Behrami and Saramati, that 
the UN was itself responsible for the actions of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo, and not 
individual states carrying out the operations, and thus the ECHR could not be applied and the 
case was inadmissible in the ECrtHR.85 
The Court stated that UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN created under Chapter VII 
and KFOR was exercising powers lawfully delegated under Chapter VII of the Charter by the 
Security Council. As such, their actions were directly attributable to the UN, an organisation of 
universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective.86 This attribution 
concerning UNMIK is clear, if we consider, for example the Draft Articles of the ILC on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations. These articles have not, however, been agreed 
upon by states and therefore are not, as such, binding codification. UNMIK is a subsidiary 
organ of the Security Council, and thus its conduct has to be considered as an act of the UN 
under international law. The Court considered the attribution to be possible also with regard to 
KFOR, as a single chain of command ran from the Security Council through NATO down to 
KFOR and the individual national contingents making up the operation87 Therefore, the 
ECrtHR concluded that the applicants’ complaints must be declared incompatible ratione 
personae with the provision of the ECHR.88 
 
84 Ginther (1991) p. 1339. 
85 Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France Germany and Norway (hereinafter Behrami and Saramati), 
Grand Chamber of the ECrtHR, 2 May 2007, paras. 151-153. 
86 Behrami and Saramati (2007) para. 151. 
87 Sari, Aurel: Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati 
Cases. in 8 Human Rights Law Review, pp. 151-170, Oxford University Press 2008, pp. 163-165 and UN Document 
A/62/10 (2007) Art. 4 p. 187. The ECrtHR has also faced criticism regarding the UN’s unified command and 
control on KFOR, whether such effective control actually existed. Sari suggests, that the conduct of KFOR should 
have been attributed either to the states contributing personnel to the operation or to NATO, or possibly to both. 
88 Behrami and Saramati (2007) para. 152. 
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On admissibility grounds, the Court removed the Saramati application against Germany 
from the docket and declared inadmissible the application of Behrami and Behrami as well as 
the remainder of the Saramati application against France and Norway.89 
The reasoning of the Court has been criticized for a number of reasons, even though even the 
critics admit that the applicants’ complaints should have been held inadmissible in any event.90 
The most fundamental of these reasons is the ECrtHR’s identification of the legal issues raised 
by the complaints. The ECrtHR correctly underlined that one of the legal issues raised by the 
case concerned the Court’s competence to review the conduct of national contributions to 
KFOR and UNMIK. However, this did not entitle it to disregard whether the applicants came 
within the jurisdiction of the respondent states as Article 1 of the ECHR presupposes. Instead 
of addressing the issue of a jurisdictional link between the applicants and the respondent states, 
the Court decided to investigate primarily, whether KFOR and UNMIK operated in the 
framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, and secondly, whether their acts and omissions could 
be attributed to the UN in accordance with the rules of international law governing the 
responsibility of international organizations.91 
The above-mentioned critique recognizes the fact that the attributability in this case of the 
relevant acts and omissions to the UN demonstrates that the UN could in principle incur 
responsibility for the internationally wrongful conduct of KFOR and UNMIK. However, this 
responsibility of the UN does not exclude the possibility that the same conduct may also be 
attributable to the respondent states and may engage their international responsibility.92 
The ECrtHR has used the Behrami and Saramati cases as precedents regarding similar 
admissibility issues. This is troubling in light of the enhancement of international responsibility 
in general, and in taking into consideration the shortcomings of the Court in the reasoning of 
the case.93 
 
89 Behrami and Saramati (2007) para. 153. 
90 Sari (2008) p. 166. 
91 Sari (2008) p. 158. 
92 Sari (2008) p. 159. 
93 The Behrami and Saramati case has already been used as reference for example in the case of Beric and Others v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina case in the ECrtHR, Fourth Section, on 16 October 2007, where the Court declared the 
applications inadmissible. Another decision of the ECrtHR regarding inadmissibility was given in the case of 
Boivin c. la France et la Belgique, et 32 autres Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe (Decision only available in French) 
on 9 September 2008. The Court distinguished the case from the cases Beer and Reagan, Waite and Kennedy vs. 
Germany, (application No. 28934/95, ECrtHR, 18 February, 1999) and Bosphorus (Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve 
Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, ECrtHR, Fourth Section 13 September 2001 and Grand Chamber 30 June 2005), 
and made a comparison to the situation in the Behrami and Saramati case to find the case inadmissible. The 
Behrami and Saramati case has also been used as reference on the national level, in the case of Al-Jedda v. Secretary of 
State for Defence in the UK House of Lords (UKHL) on 12 December 2007. However, reference was not made to 
find the case inadmissible. In the Al-Jedda case, the UKHL rejected the argument that the ECrtHR used in the 
Behrami and Saramati case by distinguishing the facts of the Al-Jedda case from those of the Behrami and Saramati 
case and it found the case admissible. 
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3.3.5  Bankovi and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States 
Another interesting case that relates to the ECHR is the Bankovi and Others v. Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom (hereinafter the Bankovi and 
Others case) of 2001, where the ECrtHR also held the application inadmissible. Vlastimir and 
Borka Bankovi and four other applicants had filed a complaint against 17 member states of the 
NATO for the deaths and injuries of their close family members that occurred due to the 
NATO missile attack against the RTS television and radio station facilities in Belgrade on 23 
April 1999.94  
The case was also used as reference later on in the Behrami and Saramati case. To summarize 
shortly the contents of the Bankovi and Others case, the ECrtHR found that it had no 
jurisdiction over the NATO attacks on FRY. It reasoned its conclusion on the grounds that 
Article 1 of the ECHR limits the competence of the ECrtHR to the cases concerning the duty 
of the High Contracting Parties to secure the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR to 
everyone within their jurisdiction. The ECrtHR concluded that the application of the ECHR 
cannot be extended to the aerial bombing of a non-member state’s territory, since it falls 
beyond the jurisdiction of the bombing state.95 
The Bankovi and Others case was in all its simplicity about the conduct of military forces of 
NATO states that were under the full control and jurisdiction of the respondent states. It 
should be clear, under international law, that this is enough to hold a state responsible. The 
ECrtHR’s reasoning is not clear enough to explain why general principles should not apply to 
the ECHR.96 
IV. Responsibility of International Organizations 
4.1  Elements of Responsibility 
4.1.1 The Conventional Position in International Law 
In Article 3 of the ILC Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations, it is 
stated that every internationally wrongful act of an international organization is within the 
 
94 Bankovi and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States (NATO member states) (Bankovi and Others), Grand 
Chamber, 12 December 2001 paras. 9-11. 
95 Altiparmak, Kerem: Bankovi: An Obstacle to the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights 
in Iraq. Journal of Conflict & Security Law 9, pp. 213-251, Oxford University Press 2004, p. 221 and the Bankovi 
and Others case (2001). 
96 Altiparmak (2004) p. 226 and the Bankovi and Others case (2001). 
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responsibility of the international organization. There is an internationally wrongful act of an 
international organization when conduct consisting of an action or omission is i) attributable to 
the international organization under international law and it ii) constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of that international organization. Damage is not included in the 
elements, as it is not included in the ILC Articles on State responsibility.97 
Once the existence of international personality of international organizations is recognized, it is 
natural that, organizations can demand responsibility of other international subjects because 
they have rights at international law. Similarly they can also be held responsible to other 
international subjects because they have obligations at international law. States have 
international responsibility in general because their duties flow from the control they have over 
territory, airspace, persons etc. or from their relations with other international subjects. In 
comparison, international organizations have a limited amount of control. However, they have 
a certain amount of control over persons, and they enter into treaties, agreements and other 
relations with other international persons which could give rise to international obligations. 
These obligations could generate responsibility in the appropriate circumstances.98 
The conventional approach to the law of international organizations disregards the tension 
between international organization and individual state responsibility. The conventional 
approach conceives responsibility for the acts of the organization exclusively in terms of the 
organization itself, not also in light of responsibility for the individual member states. A 
reflection of the idea of the separate distinct legal personality, which international organizations 
enjoy, is that the distinct legal person is responsible for the acts of the organization. If states 
perform acts as part of the structure of the international organization or act on behalf of the 
organization and in the organization’s name, these acts are as a matter of law acts of the 
organization and not the state.99 
The current state of the law concerning the responsibility of international organizations leaves a 
number of problems unsolved. Among them is the question of 'piercing the corporate veil', the 
distribution of responsibility between the organization and its member states. This question is 
of paramount importance. The ILC Draft Articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations have tried to answer this question in Art. 29, which states that a state member of 
an international organization is responsible for an internationally wrongful act of that 
organization, if it has accepted responsibility of that act or it has led the injured party to rely on 
its responsibility. This responsibility is presumed to be subsidiary and exist without prejudice to 
other possible situations regulated in the Articles, where the responsibility may exist due to 
 
97 UN Document A/62/10, Report of the International Law Commission, 59th session (7 May – 5 June and 9 July 
– 10 August 2007, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixtieth Session, Supplement No. 10 pp. 178 – 220, 
1 September 2007, Article 3, p. 185. 
98 Amerasinghe (2005) p. 399. 
99 Wilde (2008) pp. 401-402. 
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other reasons than simply due to the membership of the organization and acceptance of 
responsibility.100  
Another special legal problem as regards the implementation procedure concerns the question 
of whether international organizations are entitled to, and whether they should, set up remedial 
procedures which have to be exhausted before a third party is allowed to bring a claim against 
the organization under international law. Does the law of state responsibility concerning the 
prior exhaustion of local remedies apply here mutatis mutandis? What is the law to be applied for 
assessing damages?101 
Regardless of the remaining unclarities, two starting point principles could be presented: i) 
international organizations are responsible for the consequences of all unlawful acts attributed 
to them under international law, whether the acts are committed within their competence or 
not; ii) Where the incompetence of the organization to carry out the relevant act was manifest, 
and as a consequence the injured party was able to avoid the harmful results, the organization 
will not be held responsible toward this party.102 
4.1.2  The Obligations of International Organizations 
Article 9 of the ILC Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations states 
that an act of an international organization does not constitute a breach of an international 
obligation unless the international organization is bound by the obligation in question at the 
time the act occurs.103 
Summarizing the above-mentioned, international organizations are responsible for breach of 
international agreements. When for example the IBRD and the International Development 
Association (IDA) enter into loan and credit agreements with states, which are international 
agreements governed by international law, the failure on the part of the IBRD or the IDA 
respectively to carry out its obligations under such agreements would trigger their international 
responsibility. There are various other examples of agreements that could generate international 
responsibility in case the organizations failed to carry out their obligations under them.104 For 
example, in the World Health Organization (WHO) Agreement case105, the question brought before 
the ICJ was, whether the WHO had violated its obligations under an agreement with Egypt, 
 
100 UN Document A/62/10 (2007) Article 29, p. 194. 
101 Ginther (1991) pp. 1338 – 1339. 
102 Hirsch (1995) p. 16. 
103 UN Document A/62/10 (2007) Articles 8-9, p. 187. 
104 Amerasinghe (2005) p. 400. 
105 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (1980) Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice, 20 December 1980, ICJ Reports (1980) p. 67. 
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there being no question that the WHO could have been responsible to Egypt for the breach 
of its obligations under the agreement.106 
As with regards to the responsibility of organizations under customary international law, 
possibly on the analogy of the law governing relations between states, international 
organizations can also have international obligations towards other international legal persons 
arising from the particular circumstances in which they are placed or from particular 
relationships. In the WHO Agreement case the ICJ specifically referred to the existence of 
obligations at customary international law for international organizations.107 There are 
situations in which international organizations would be responsible under customary 
international law for the acts of their servants or agents, when they are acting in the 
performance of their functions, or of persons or groups acting under the control of the 
organizations, such as armed forces in the case of the UN. There have been claims arising from 
the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) in the 1960s, brought against the UN by 
states relating to injury to their nationals, which were based on violations of international law 
and which were settled by negotiations between the UN and the states concerned.108 
The content of the obligations of international organizations could easily be identified in the 
case of constitutive instruments, other treaties or agreements, depending on the interpretation 
and application of such instruments. Regarding customary international law, as in the case of 
obligations owed to organizations, the obligations will be based on fault, risk or absolute 
liability, as the case may be, depending on the obligation and the content of the applicable 
customary international law.109 
4.1.3  Limits of Organizational Competence and the Scope of Control 
The recognition of the importance of international organizations in the international society 
should not blur the recognition of their limitations stemming from the nature of the 
relationship between the organizations and their members. The organizations are basically 
instruments for international cooperation and their operations are to a large extent prescribed 
by the governments of the member states.110 
One example regarding problems that can be generated by international organizations is the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). In the opinion of some commentators, this organization 
has had a tendency to stray from its constitutional aims and exercise influence in areas that 
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seem outside the limits of its competence (ultra vires). This phenomenon has been described 
in legal literature as ‘linkage’. This ultra vires activity means that an expansionist-oriented 
organization has infiltrated an area that does not appear to be within the scope of its 
competence. Another organization that has undergone recent criticism, in this respect, is the 
IMF.111 
International organizations have generally been found to be at fault in connection with damage 
resulting from conduct of their servants, agents, persons or groups under their control, such as 
armed forces. There may be delicate issues concerning who is responsible in some cases where 
persons are under the control of more than one international person, such as where armed 
forces belonging to a state participate in an operation sponsored by the UN or pursuant to a 
decision of the UN. However, in such cases the issue is one of attribution of responsibility on 
the basis of control. There is no reason why analogies should not be borrowed from the 
principle of imputability applied in the customary law of state responsibility, particularly, for 
injuries for aliens. Similarly, in the area of the general responsibility of international 
organizations for acts of servants or agents, analogies from the law of state responsibility may be 
relevant in appropriate situations in determining imputability. The subject of imputability, 
where acts of organs, servants, agents or independent contractors are concerned, will depend on 
whether the organ or individual concerned was acting within the scope of ‘apparent authority’. 
This is particularly so in the case of acts performed outside the actual authority granted. Thus, 
though the act may in fact be done without authority, it may engage the responsibility of the 
organization, because it is within the scope of apparent authority.112 
Questions of responsibility have arisen particularly in the case of armed forces engaged in UN 
‘controlled’ operations. In such cases the UN has generally accepted responsibility for any illegal 
acts which may have been committed by armed forces (belonging to member states) acting 
under the UN aegis. The UN has acknowledged responsibility for activities carried out by both 
the United Nations Energy Force (UNEF) and the UNOC, for instance.113 
The main issues that arise in these cases again are i) whether there has been an unlawful act or 
omission; and ii) whether such act is imputable to the organization. Regarding the first issue, 
the UN has refused to bear responsibility for damages caused by its lawful military operations or 
arising from military necessity – these acts are not unlawful. On the other hand, the UN has 
accepted liability for all damage not justified by military necessity (e.g. as a result of destruction 
without necessity, murder, imprisonment, arbitrary expulsion and such acts). 114 
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4.1.4  The Element of Attribution 
As international organizations are subjects of international law and capable of possessing rights 
and being subject to obligations under international law, the question is, whether and under 
which conditions internationally wrongful acts can be attributed to an international 
organization per se as to trigger its responsibility.115 
The ILC Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations also touch the 
subject of attribution in Articles 4-7. According to Article 4, the conduct of an organ or agent 
of an international organization in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be 
considered as an act of that organization under international law, no matter what position the 
organ or agent holds in respect of the organization. Article 5 states that the conduct of an organ 
of a state or an organ or agent of an international organization that is placed at the disposal of 
another international organization shall be considered under international law an act of the 
latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct. Article 6 
states that the organization cannot avoid responsibility even in a situation, where the conduct 
exceeds the authority of that organ or agent or contravenes instructions. According to Article 7, 
even if the conduct is not attributable to an international organization, the organization may 
acknowledge and adopt the conduct in question as its own.116 
4.2  Recent Developments 
4.2.1  Two Key Policy Issues  
As stated above, there are two key policy issues regarding the relationship between the 
responsibility of international organizations and the responsibility of member states. The first 
key issue concerns the efficiency and independence of international organizations in their 
functions. The second relates to the applicability of the responsibility principle.117 
The Institut de Droit international states a principle regarding the first issue: “support for the 
credibility and independent functioning of international organizations and for the 
establishment of new international organizations”.118 Member state responsibility in a 
traditional sense is seen as undermining this principle. The potential problem caused by 
enforcing member state responsibility for the acts of international organizations is the paralysis 
within existing organizations, with consensus required for every decision. States might also be 
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reluctant to create and support new international organizations in the future out of a fear of 
running the risk of responsibility for future acts they may not be able to control. Such 
responsibility necessarily contradicts the nature of those international organizations conceived 
in a manner whereby all member states are not necessarily able to control all the acts and 
functions of the organization, for example when decisions are taken by the UN Security 
Council.119 
According to the responsibility principle, third parties should be protected against undue 
exposure to loss and damage that they have not themselves caused, in relationships with 
international organizations. The focus is thus on those affected by the actions of international 
organizations, who should be provided with legal redress, when such actions lead them to suffer 
harm or some other loss. This victim-orientated approach leads to the related violator-
orientated approach of avoiding impunity, which argues that a state cannot escape its liability 
under international law by entrusting to another legal person the fulfilment of its international 
obligations.120 
This dual principle, that third parties affected by the acts of international organizations should 
be given redress, and that states should not be able to evade legal responsibility by transferring 
competences to international organizations – would clearly be supported if member states were 
made legally responsible for the acts of organizations of which they are a member.121 
During its Session of Lisbon in 1995, based on the work of the Rapporteur of the Fifth 
Commission, Institut de Droit international adopted a resolution on ‘The Legal Consequences for 
Member States of the Non-fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations 
toward Third Parties’. In its decision the Institut took into consideration the tensions between 
the importance of the independent responsibility of international organizations on the one 
hand, and the need to protect third parties dealing with such international organizations, on 
the other hand. It also recognized the diversity of international organizations, and the fact that 
it may not be possible to accomplish a solution which could suit all organizations.122 
The traditional position which excludes member state responsibility promotes the first policy 
objective of ensuring the effective functioning of international organizations. Therefore the 
Institut de Droit international resolved that  
“important considerations of policy, including support for the credibility and 
independent functioning of international organizations and for the establishment of 
new international organizations, militate against the development of a general and 
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comprehensive rule of liability of member States to third parties for the obligations of 
international organizations.”123 
However, those supporting this position do not do so by disregarding the responsibility 
principle: they do not reason that the effective functioning trumps the need to ensure 
accountability. They rather seek to promote accountability through alternative means: better 
safeguards for third parties operating in relation to international organizations directly. The 
Institut further concludes that 
“Important considerations of policy entitle third parties to know, so that they may freely 
choose their course of action, whether, in relation to any particular transaction or to 
dealings generally with an international organization, the financial liabilities that may 
ensue are those of the organization alone or also of the members jointly or subsidiarily. 
Accordingly, an international organization should specify the position regarding liability 
1) in its Rules and contracts; 2) in communications made to the third party prior to the 
event or transaction leading to liability; or 3) in response to any specific request by any 
third party for information on the matter.”124 
When transactions are freely entered into, adequate remedies for third parties would not 
necessarily be required, the key requirement being transparency as to the nature of remedies. 
This way, an informed decision can be made. For transactions that are imposed, adequate 
remedies are arguably necessary. In the case of a failure to protect, being ‘on notice’ of a lack of 
responsibility is beside the point; the idea here is that there should be a responsibility to take 
effective action.125 
The underlying rationale for the lack of member state responsibility in relation to the acts of 
international organizations has to be understood, then, in terms of a separate area of 
international law. This area concerns the responsibility of international organizations and the 
provision of remedies against these actors directly. When the two are taken together, both 
policy objectives seem to be supported: the functioning of international organizations is not 
compromised, nor is securing responsibility and redress.126 
4.2.2  Problems with the Current Situation 
As far as the law is concerned, it is relatively unclear whether and to what extent international 
organizations are subject to national and international law. No standing international court or 
tribunal has jurisdiction to hear complaints brought directly against international organizations, 
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and due to privileges and immunities such complaints are usually barred on the domestic 
level. Even if it was clear that international organizations were capable of being legally 
responsible for their acts by virtue of their possession of international legal personality, 
uncertainties would remain.127 
As an example presented by Wilde, individuals complaining of a breach of their civil and 
political rights by a member state of the Council of Europe would be able to invoke the state’s 
obligations under the ECHR (provided the alleged breach took place within the state’s 
‘jurisdiction’ for the purposes of the Convention). If they were denied an effective legal remedy 
against that state in domestic courts, they would then be entitled to bring a case to the 
ECrtHR.128 Such individuals complaining of a breach of their civil and political rights by the 
UN – as for example in Kosovo, where the UN is the governmental authority – such a breach is 
not regulated by the ECHR, domestic remedies are largely absent because of the enjoyment of 
legal immunities by the UN and its officials, and there is no standing before the ECrtHR to 
bring cases directly against the UN as opposed to an ECHR contracting state. An Ombudsman 
can hear complaints against the UN but its decisions are purely recommendatory and it has no 
enforcement powers.129 This is also close to what happened in the Behrami and Saramati case 
presented above, where the ECrtHR declared the case inadmissible. 
Therefore, in general, there is a legal bar against remedies against the member states of 
international organizations flowing from the lack of responsibility on the part of member states. 
This legal bar is matched by the lack of remedies available against such organizations as a matter 
of fact. Although states act through international organizations in a broad range of functions, 
the remedies obtainable against them or the organizations involved for breaches of 
international law are severely limited.130 
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4.2.3  The Work of the International Law Commission 
In 2000, the ILC decided to include the responsibility of international organizations in its long-
term programme of work.131 In December of the following year 2001, the General Assembly of 
the UN requested the ILC to commence its work on the topic.132  
Two developments in the background initiated the process of the work of the ILC on the 
subject. Firstly, the ILC examines at regular intervals the full range of issues related to 
international law in order to identify matters that would be appropriate for codification. When 
the ILC began selecting possible topics during its session in 1998, it was in the final phase of 
elaborating Draft Articles on the International Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts. It 
was a success after forty years of work, and it encouraged the ILC to extend its discussion of 
responsibility to international organizations.133 
Secondly, the ILC had earlier worked on international organizations. Its previous work resulted 
in 1975 in the adoption of the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their 
Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character. Another convention that 
related to international organizations and developed out of the ILC’s work was the 1986 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations. 
Discussions regarding other subjects relating to international organizations were also held. The 
existence of international organizations and their growing importance has been and still is 
urging the ILC to take a closer look at legal questions relating to them.134 
At its fifty-fourth session, the ILC decided, at its 2717th meeting held on 8 May, 2002, to 
include the topic in its programme of work and appointed Mr. Giorgio Gaja as Special 
Rapporteur on the topic. The Working Group considered the following issues in its works: a) 
the scope of the subject, including the concepts of responsibility and international 
organizations; b) relations between the subject of responsibility of international organizations 
and the Articles on State Responsibility; c) questions of attribution, d) questions of 
responsibility of member states for conduct that is attributed to an international organization; 
e) other questions concerning when responsibility arises for an international organization; f) 
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questions on the content and implementation of international responsibility; g) settlement of 
disputes; and h) the question of what practice is to be taken into consideration.135 
The Working Group recommended that the UN Secretariat approach international 
organizations and collect relevant materials, especially on questions of attribution and the 
responsibility of member states for conduct that is attributed to an international 
organization.136 The ILC adopted the report of the Working Group.137 
The ILC has so far adopted 66 Draft Articles.138 Many of the Articles have been the object of 
comments after their provisional adoption, especially in the debates held in the Sixth 
Committee of the UN on the report of the ILC and in written statements made by states and 
international organizations. Certain Articles have been examined in judicial practice.139 
However, the Draft Articles have not yet been extensively tried in international legal 
proceedings or much in legal literature either, and their impact on the current situation is still 
somewhat uncertain.  
4.2.4  The Work of the International Law Association 
The International Law Association established a committee on the Accountability of 
International Organizations in May 1996, and its mandate was: “to consider what measures 
(legal, administrative or otherwise) should be adopted to ensure the accountability of public 
international Organizations to their members and to third parties, and of members and third 
parties to such Organizations. In particular, the Committee may consider such issues as: a) the 
relations between member states, third parties and international Organizations; b) redress by 
and against international Organizations, including access to the International Court of Justice 
and other courts and tribunals, and related issues of procedure; c) the relations between 
different forms of accountability of international Organizations (legal, political, administrative, 
financial) and d) the dissolution of international Organizations and related questions of 
succession.”140 
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The First Report of the Committee was presented to the 68th Conference of the ILA at 
Taipei, 1998, and it laid down the legal framework for accountability of international 
organizations. The Second Report was presented to the 69th Conference at London, 2000, and 
it comprised a discussion of relevant general principles, to which was annexed a Co-
Rapporteurs’ draft of recommended rules and practices (RRP). The Third Report, presented at 
the 70th Conference at New Delhi, 2002, contained a consolidated, revised and enlarged 
versions of RRPs, and the Final Report, further categorizing the RRPs was presented to the 71st 
Conference at Berlin, 2004.141 
In its Final Report, the Committee had decided not to discuss the concurrent or residual 
responsibility of member states for non-fulfilment by International Organizations of their 
obligations toward third parties. The Committee considered the question fully covered in the 
1995 Resolution of the Institut de Droit international: 'The Legal Consequences for Member 
States of the Non-Fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third 
Parties'.142 
Those who endorse the general view of a lack of member state responsibility in a broader 
context have focused their attention on seeking to improve mechanisms for securing the 
responsibility of international organizations. The Final Report, for example, concluded that this 
regime should be enhanced.143 
V. Conclusion 
No such situation should arise, where an international organization would not be accountable 
to some authority for an illegal act attributable to that organization.144 A precondition for the 
responsibility of international organizations is a separate legal personality of these organizations, 
but this does not determine whether member states have a concurrent or residual responsibility 
or not.145 
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These are interesting times when it comes to the development of international responsibility. 
With the adoption of the ILC Articles on the responsibility of international organizations, the 
increasing legal practice and the hopefully successful UN reform, the time is now to focus on 
the issue of the relation between the responsibility of international organizations and the 
responsibility of their members. Should the corporate veil of an international organization be 
pierced and the member state responsibility invoked? If yes, how do we still need to develop the 
current legal framework in order to establish this member state responsibility? If not, how do 
we look after the interests of third parties? How do we make sure that the international 
organizations can be held accountable for their actions?  
In Europe, the times are also interesting due to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty146. The 
Treaty defines the legal personality of the European Union, making it a stronger actor in its 
own right, within the international community and, for example, opens the possibility for the 
European Union to accede to the ECHR. It is evident from the cases presented above that case 
law does not deliver a unified stance on the question of member state responsibility under 
international law. Therefore, the existing legal practice has not created a customary norm 
regarding member state responsibility in international law.147 
Current legal practice has even produced detrimental precedents, as can be seen in the Behrami 
and Saramati case in the ECrtHR, when it comes to the protection of human rights and the 
endorsement of international responsibility. If a principle of international responsibility is not 
clear to the courts, as was obvious in the Bankovi and Others case (where full control and 
jurisdiction of the respondent states did not result in state responsibility), further academic 
debate is definitely needed. 
Taking into consideration the efforts of non-state actors such as the ILC, ILA and the Institut de 
Droit international, the problem is not necessarily so much the lack of academic efforts regarding 
questions of substance, but the lack of consistent jurisprudence, caused to a large extent by the 
procedural difficulties surrounding these cases. The aforementioned efforts, especially the ILC 
Draft Articles, should be accepted by states as binding international law. By adopting clear 
procedural rules and more easily subjecting international organizations to claims, the 
substantive guidelines on international responsibility can develop into practice.  
A great step forward could be attained by amending the role of the ICJ. The ILA Committee 
would not include its conclusions regarding the amendment of the ICJ Statute in the main 
body of its Final Report, as it is a topic that divides academics and consequently, on which 
consensus is difficult to reach. Nevertheless, further academic discussions are encouraged in 
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order to make the topic of the ICJ Statute and the general question of procedural barriers to 
finding international organizations responsible easier to approach.  
In conclusion, there remain four points of consideration for the future development of 
international responsibility. By taking on these four challenges, the harm from the remaining 
unclarities could be brought down to a minimum. The interests of third parties would be better 
protected and unwanted surprises regarding responsibility issues for member states, and also 
international organizations themselves, could be avoided.  
1. Removing procedural obstacles: The Statute of the ICJ should be amended to accept 
international organizations as parties in cases before the Court. This would not open the 
Court to individuals, but it would enable the Court to hear cases, where the injured 
third party and claimant or the respondent is an international organization. This would 
be a great step forward in the field of international responsibility.  
2. Improving existing structures: If and when jurisdictional immunity continues to 
form a barrier to remedial action for non-state claimants, adequate alternative remedial 
protection mechanisms within international organizations should be encouraged and 
developed. 
3. Increasing transparency and good faith: An international organization should specify 
the position regarding responsibility in its rules. Organizations should also be encouraged 
to provide parties with the necessary information as to the allocation of responsibility 
between the organization and its member states. This information should be given prior 
to the conclusion of the agreement concerned, or at the start of the operational activity 
envisaged by the organization and its member states.  
4. Referring disputes to arbitration: If possible, when concluding agreements with 
states or non-state entities, international organizations should add a clause providing for 
compulsory referral to arbitration of any dispute that the parties have been unable to settle 
through other means. 
 
